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Irreversible (One-hit) and Reversible (Sustaining) Causation  
Abstract: This paper explores a distinction across causal relationships that has yet to receive 
attention in the philosophical literature, namely, whether causal relationships are reversible or 
irreversible.  We provide an analysis of this distinction and show how it has important 
implications for causal inference and modeling. This work also clarifies how various familiar 
puzzles involving preemption and over-determination play out differently depending on 
whether the causation involved is reversible.   
1 Introduction. 
Recent work in philosophy of causation has explored differences among causal relationships, 
rather than just describing the contrast between relations that are or are not causal. This work 
assumes that relationships that are causal in some broad sense (e.g., in virtue of satisfying an 
interventionist conception of causation) can differ among themselves in ways that deserve 
philosophical attention.  For example, causal relationships can differ in their degree of stability, 
specificity, proportionality, and their “speed” or temporal structure (Woodward 2010; 
Blanchard et al. 2018; Ross 2018). This paper explores an additional distinction among causal 
relationships, which to the best of our knowledge has not yet been discussed in the 
philosophical literature–namely, whether the relationship is reversible or irreversible.1  By a 
reversible causal relationship  between X and Y we mean a relationship such that if a change dx 
in X causes a change dy in Y at time t, then a reversal of this change in X at a later time can 
reverse  or “undo” this effect.  For example, if turning a light switch on causes a light to shine, 
and turning it off “reverses” this, extinguishing the light, this causal relation is reversible.  
Similarly, if the close proximity of the moon causes high tides, and the moon's different position 
at a later time reverses this, causing low tides, we have reversibility. As we note below, this sort 
of reversibility is commonly assumed in causal modeling frameworks and it is characteristic of 
most fundamental physical laws.  It is striking, however, that it is not present in many of the 
most prominent cause-effect examples in the philosophical literature. When Suzy throws a rock 
that breaks a bottle, her rock cannot be “unthrown” in a way that restores the broken bottle. 
Similarly, if a sniper successfully shoots the enemy or the King is poisoned, neither of these 
effects can be undone by restoring the cause to its earlier state. These “one-hit” causes (as we 
shall call them) are “irreversible” with respect to the effects they produce. As we shall see this 
has important implications for how we should model such cases—we should not model them 
by means of a framework that assumes reversible causation.  It is also the case that various 
familiar puzzles involving preemption and over-determination play out differently depending on 
whether the causation involved is reversible.  
Irreversible causation is not just important in everyday cases–-it figures in many areas of 
science including, perhaps especially, the social, behavioral, and biological sciences.  Lieberson 
(1985) discusses the establishment of English as the dominant language for international 
communication as one example. While many causal factors have led to this, including the 
geopolitical influence of the U.K. and the U.S., diminishing this influence alone seems unlikely to 
                                                     
1 The one discussion that we know of in the social science literature is Lieberson (1985). 
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remove the dominance of English, at least in the short run. Once a language is widely adopted, 
the large costs of moving to an alternative language may keep the former in use even if the 
causes of its initial adoption are removed. As another illustration, based loosely on Wilson 
(1987) and Kearney and Wilson (2018), suppose that in an area in which wages and marriage 
rates are previously high, wage rates decline, which causes a decline in marriage rates (due to 
fewer eligible partners to support families). If wage rates subsequently increase, we should not 
necessarily expect an increase in marriage rates—the prior decrease in marriage may involve 
changes in attitudes and values that persist and continue to lead to low marriage rates even if 
wages increase.  As Lieberson puts it, once an effect occurs it can “create circumstances that 
will perpetuate itself even if the initial causal variable is reversed” (1985, p.76). As these 
examples suggest, irreversible causation is often present in the social realm because of changes 
in “culture”, expectations, and memories that remain when their external causes do not persist.  
Other cases of irreversible causation come from the biomedical sciences. For example, some 
causes damage biological structures without providing a means to reverse this damage.   If five 
years of heavy smoking causes lung cancer, five subsequent years of smoking cessation will not 
reverse this. In other cases, irreversible causation may be part of a normal developmental 
process as when a pluripotent stem cell acquires the characteristics of a specific tissue type.    
2. A More Detailed Look at Irreversibility  
We have defined irreversible causal relations as those in which a change in C causes a change in 
E but returning C to its original state does not return of E to its original state. This covers two 
distinct possibilities.  In some cases (a) reversal of the effect is either strictly impossible as when 
a patient dies or it is understood to be impossible for all practical purposes--when a letter is 
burned there is no practical possibility of collecting the combustion products to reconstruct the 
letter. In other cases, (b) the effect can be reversed, but only through factors other than the 
initial triggering cause. For example, when a falling bookshelf causes someone to break a bone, 
returning the bookshelf to its original position won’t unbreak the bone, but physiological 
processes may be in place to restore the bone back to an unbroken state. Similarly, it might be 
possible in principle to restore a broken bottle to its unbroken state but this will involve 
operations on factors other than the cause of the breaking. We treat both (a and b) as cases of 
irreversible causation. 
The notion of reversibility just described should be distinguished from the feature of 
time reversal invariance possessed by many fundamental physical laws. The latter has to do 
with whether, when a process is permitted by a law, the process described by its time reversal 
(the result of substituting -t for t and perhaps making substitutions for other quantities in the 
law, such as the replacement of the magnetic field B with -B) is also permitted. Among many 
other differences, our notion of reversibility is not characterized in terms of operations on a 
time variable or its derivatives, although it does involve relationships between values of 
variables at different times-- see below.  It is nonetheless the case that many fundamental 
physical laws describe relationships that are also reversible in our sense. For example, when 
current is passed through a wire, an electromagnetic field is created and when the current is 
stopped, this field will disappear.  If the distance d between two masses is increased to 2d, 
causing a decrease in the gravitational force between them, returning the distance back to d, 
causes the gravitational force to return to its original value, again illustrating reversibility in our 
sense. In these cases, the present value of some variable in a system just depends (for all values 
of this variable) on the present value of other variables characterizing the system—when this 
feature is present, the causal relation in question will automatically be reversible in our sense. 
This feature is not present in systems exhibiting hysteresis, in which the present state of some 
variable depends not just on the present state of other variables characterizing the system but 
on the history of the system—the causes to which it was exposed in the past and perhaps the 
temporal order in which these occur.   
 However, our notion of irreversibility is stronger than the notion of a system exhibiting 
hysteresis. In the latter case, it might be possible to undo an effect by appropriately reversing 
the various causes in its history. By contrast in irreversible causation, one cannot undo the 
effect by undoing its original causes. Irreversible causation is thus stronger than mere influence 
of the past; it involves past causes putting a system in a state which cannot be further 
influenced by presently restoring those causes to their original state or perhaps cannot be 
further relevantly changed by operations on any present causes. It may well be true that at a 
fundamental physical level, all physical laws are reversible in our sense, with apparent 
irreversibility reflecting the fact that we are operating with models and representations that 
omit relevant variables. But in common sense contexts and in much of science, including 
biology and the social and behavioral sciences, we are stuck with non-fundamental theories and 
thus have to deal with phenomena like irreversibility and hysteresis.2  
 We seem to have different mental models when we think about reversible and 
irreversible causation and we think in terms of different paradigmatic applications. To begin 
with the latter, the cases in which irreversible causation is operative virtually automatically call 
for “actual cause judgments” about particular causal interactions. This is to be expected—if a 
change in the cause puts the effect in a state which cannot be reversed by reversing the cause, 
we are naturally led to treat the case in terms of a “one-off” judgment that focuses only on that 
particular interaction, since there is no possibility of the cause “doing” anything more to the 
effect at other times. The one-off change in marriage rates in the example above illustrates this. 
This is not to say that one cannot make actual cause judgments about examples involving 
                                                     
2 An interesting question, which we will not try to explore in detail, has to do with the 
relationship between irreversible causation and the second law of thermodynamics. Many of 
our examples of irreversible causation involve what one informally thinks of as entropy increase 
– the king who transitions from live to dead, the broken bottle etc. In those cases of irreversible 
causation in which the effect is reversible (but not by reversing the cause) the causes that might 
be employed to reverse the effects typically involve the very precise coordination of a number 
of factors in a way that looks (locally) anti-entropic: someone needs to piece together the 
broken glass and so on. In such cases, if the effect is reversible at all this usually seems to 
require something more complicated and organized than the mere reversal of the original 
cause. On the other hand, it is not clear, how if at all, the notion of   entropy might be applied 
to some of our examples like falling marriage rates—this is why we say “many” above.  
 
reversible causation—when a light is caused to go on or off depending on the state of a switch 
(reversible causation), turning the switch from off to on at some particular time is regarded as 
the actual cause of the light going on.  However, in this case, unlike examples involving 
irreversible causation, one also thinks about the system in terms of a type-level causal relation 
that is repeatable for that system. It is thus unsurprising that the philosophical literature on 
judgments of actual causation tends to focus almost entirely on examples involving irreversible 
causation—these are cases that naturally invite such judgments.  
When an interaction involves irreversible causation our mental picture is that the cause 
“acts” just once to produce the effect, but once the effect has occurred, the cause does not 
continue to act to keep the effect in place—the impact of the rock shatters the bottle but once 
this happens, the rock and its impact don’t continue to operate to keep the bottle shattered. 
Both the cause and the effect involve changes or transitions from one state to another (no 
impact to impact, bottle unshattered to shattered) that take typically place over identifiable 
and often short time intervals—thus an interaction that is naturally coded as a relation 
between “events”. By contrast, in typical cases of reversible causation, the cause continues to 
act as long (but only as long) as the effect is present—it “sustains” the effect. For example, the 
weight that extends the spring is naturally viewed as an ongoing cause rather than a discrete 
event.  
3. How the distinction between reversible and irreversible causation matters for both 
inference and modeling. 
 
 Standard causal modeling frameworks typically assume that causal relations are reversible. For 
example, when one writes down an ordinary linear regression equation  
 
(3.1) Y= a1 X1+…+ an Xn 
 
this implies that if, say, X1 is increased by dX1, Y will increase by d a1 X1 and that if X1 is then 
decreased by the same amount, Y will return to its original value—the equation implies that the 
value of Y just depends on the current value of X1 etc. and not on the previous values of this 
variable. In a context in which different values of X1… Xn are observed for a system over time, a 
mistaken assumption of reversibility can easily lead to incorrect inferences. Suppose, to return 
to an earlier example, we observe marriage rates and wages in a particular area over time, and 
we attempt to represent the relation between these two variables via a reversible model like 
(3.1). Suppose, as assumed above, the actual causal relation is irreversible: if one begins with a 
state in which wages and marriage rates are high, a first time decline in wages will cause a 
decline in marriage but once the decline in marriage occurs, it becomes “locked in” (due to 
changes in attitudes and values) and subsequent increases in wages will not cause increases in 
marriage.  Observing a time series of wage and marriage levels over time, with the former but 
not the latter changing over time, one will observe virtually no (or a very weak) correlation 
between these two variables, which may lead to the mistaken conclusion that there was never 
any causal relation between wages and marriage rates. But, ex hypothesi, there was such a 
relation for the initial change in wages although there is no subsequent relation between wages 
and marriage at later times.  We need to use a model other than (3.1) which is sensitive to the 
possibility of irreversible causation to detect this possibility. 
Consider next models of actual causation using structural equations—a currently very 
popular enterprise (see, e.g Halpern (2016)). Begin with a very simple possibility: Suzy throws a 
rock, it hits an intact bottle and the bottle shatters, with the causal relations assumed to be 
deterministic. A standard way of representing this, adopted by Halpern, is with binary variables 
ST (for Suzy throws), SH (representing whether Suzy’s rock hits an intact bottle) and BS (for 
bottle shattering). ST=1 if Suzy throws, ST=0 if she does not and SH and BS similarly take values 
{1,0}.  




(3.3) BS= SH,  
 
with ST=1  
 
from which, on standard accounts of actual causation such as Halpern (2016), one concludes 
that ST=1 causes BS=1, in accord with intuitive judgment.   
 Note, though, that this model represents the causation involved as reversible or at least 
fails to represent that the causation involved is not reversible. This is reflected in the fact that 
(3.1) – (3.2) make no explicit reference to time -- such reference is required to explicitly model 
irreversibility. Suppose that we incorporate such references -- we interpret ST so that it can 
take different values over time, writing ST(t)=1 to mean Suzy is throwing at time t and similarly 
for the other variables. Then, if ST(t)= 0 at any time t, we do have SH (t) = 0   in accord with 
(3.2).  On the other hand, if Suzy throws for the first time at t, then if she throws again at some 
later time, so that ST(t+d) also =1, it will not be the case that SH (t+d) =1 contrary to what a 
time-indexed analog of (3.1) implies. Moreover, once Suzy throws the subsequent state of ST 
will have no influence on the BS variable, again contrary to what (3.2) and (3.3) imply. All of this 
is a reflection of the fact that the causation involved is irreversible—it is part of our 
understanding of the problem that once SH=1, this event cannot undone by ST= 0 at some later 
time and similarly for BS=1.  
It thus seems that when we employ equations like (3.2)- (3.3) we tacitly understand 
them as relying on additional constraints or interpretive requirements that are not made 
explicit either in this representation or a simple time-indexed variant. In particular there are 
constraints among the values the variables can take at different times: e.g., if SH(t) =1, SH (t’)=0 
for all times t’ > t.  There is also the implicit constraint that the bottle is intact before Suzy 
throws for the first time—if it is not, neither SH or BS will depend on ST. A similar constraint 
should be imposed on BS(t): once BS(t)=1, BS(t) =1 at all later times.  
When dealing with cases containing the simple structure just described these subtleties 
may seem not to matter much since, as noted above, such cases involve one-off, actual cause 
judgments in which our focus is just on the causal relationships at the single time when Suzy’s 
rock strikes the bottle and not at any other time. Note though that even in this case a fully 
explicit accurate modeling seems to require reference not just to time but to relations among 
the possible states the variables can assume at different times.  
           The role of considerations having to do with reversibility becomes more salient when we 
look at more complex cases involving actual cause judgment. Consider the late pre-emption 
example modeled in Halpern (2016).  Both Billy and Suzy throw rocks at the bottle. Suzy’s rock 
hits the bottle and it shatters but if Suzy’s rock had not hit the bottle, Billy’s rock would have hit 
it a moment later and it would have shattered. As it is, Billy’s rock just passes through the 
empty space where the bottle had been.  Our clear judgment is that the impact of Suzy’s rock 
caused the shattering. Halpern models this as follows (with ST=1)   
 
(3.4) BS= SH  or BH 
 
(3.5) SH= ST  
 
(3.6) BH= BT  and not SH  
 
What is noteworthy here is equation 3.6 and the arrow from SH (Suzy hits intact bottle) to BH 
(Billy hits intact bottle). Thus, SH is represented as causing BH—Halpern says that SH=1 
“prevents” BH=1 (and presumably causes BH=0). As Halpern acknowledges this SH BH 
relation is required for the model to reproduce the judgment that ST and not BT causes BS=1. 
                 Halpern’s modeling choice seems problematic for several reasons, which trace back to 
the distinctive features of irreversible causation. As a warm-up observation, note that SH =1 
does not seem to prevent BH =1 in any ordinary sense of “prevent”. In the ordinary sense X=1 
prevents an outcome Y=1 by interfering or interacting with some other cause Z of Y (a Z that 
"threatens" to cause Y) that would have caused Y=1 if X had not acted. But SH= 1 does not   
seem to interact or interfere with BH =1 in the way that an ordinary preventer would. Of 
course, if SH=1, this restricts the possible values of BH-- it is not possible for BH=1 (because 
once hit by Suzy, Billy's rock cannot hit an intact bottle).  But it isn't clear that this is a matter of 
there being a causal relation between SH and BH. 
We can provide support for this intuitive assessment by appealing to the following 
constraint on causal modeling (see, e.g. Woodward, 2020).  Prior to writing down the structural 
equations governing a system, the variables characterizing the system should satisfy the 
following co-possibility constraint: although the same variable cannot have different values at 
the same time, all combinations of values for distinct variables (or for the same variable applied 
to different units) should be possible. Thus, while the same ball cannot have mass of both 1 kg 
and 2kg at the same time, distinct balls can have the same or different masses and each ball can 
have a range of possible velocities, given its mass. (Mass and velocity are distinct variables). In 
physics, such co-possibility constraints are reflected in the state space specified for the system, 
with the dynamics for the system specified separately and characterizing the causal relations 
for the system, analogously to the structural equations in causal modeling. We generally think 
of the possibilities and impossibilities associated with this state space specification as non-
causal in character. For example, cannon ball 1’s having mass 1 kg does not “cause” it to not to 
have mass 2kg or “prevent” it from having that mass. Moreover, when variables are such that 
not all of their values are co-possible, we often take this to be an indication that the variables 
are not really “distinct” in a way that allows them to stand in causal relationships. To take a 
well-worn example, if L is a variable the values of which correspond to saying hello loudly (=1) 
or not saying hello at all (L=0) and H a variable the values of which correspond to saying hello 
(=1) and not saying hello at all (= 0), then combinations of values like L=1, H=O are impossible.  
This is reflected in our judgment that although these variables stand in a dependency relation 
of some kind this relationship is not causal.  
It is arguable that these sorts of co-possibility constraints are violated in Halpern’s 
model. Assuming Halpern’s interpretation of SH and BH as their respective rocks hitting an 
intact bottle, and assuming the usual understanding of bottle and rock behavior in terms of 
irreversibility, there seems to be no such possibility as BH=1 and SH=1, unless both rocks hit the 
bottle at the same time, which would turn the case into one involving overdetermination rather 
than pre-emption. Arguably it is because the co-possibility constraint is violated in the pre-
emption scenario when BH, SH=1, that it is inappropriate to describe SH as causing BH.3  We 
can bring this out more clearly by contrasting this case  with a (science-fictionish)  reversible 
analog: first, Suzy throws, SH=1, BS=1 but then (since Suzy is no longer throwing) ST=0 and, 
miraculously, (in accord with reversibility) SH  and BS instantly revert to 0, so that when Billy’s 
rock arrives an instant later, it strikes a reassembled intact bottle which then shatters (BH =1, 
BS=1).  This allows for the possibility of both BH and SH =1 on a single scenario in which both 
Suzy and Billy throw at the same bottle at nearly the same time but of course now the causal 
structure is very different from what was envisioned in the original scenario. Moreover, it is not 
so clear that this is naturally viewed as a case of pre-emption rather than two rock impacts 
having two different, distinct effects. As the contrast between these scenarios makes clear, 
what distinguishes the two scenarios is whether the causation involved is irreversible.  
It seems to us that in attempting to model the original preemption case in a way that   
neglects the distinctive character of irreversible causation, Halpern's treatment is   
unnecessarily complicated. In particular, given that we are dealing with irreversible causation it 
follows immediately just from SH=1 and BS=1 at time t that there can be no other cause of BS=1 
occurring after time t.  Thus, since Billy’s rock does not hit at the same time as Suzy’s we can 
infer that SH=1 alone caused BS=1, without assuming that SH=1 causes BH=0. Of course, this 
alternative treatment exploits the irreversible character of the interaction which would need to 
be modeled. 
It will be instructive to compare this example with another which does involve reversible 
causation. Suppose that if either of two switches, S1 and S2 is on (=1), a light is on (L=1). If 
neither switch is on (S1, S2= 0) the light is off (L=0). Here the causation involved is reversible: the 
light can be repeatedly turned on and off by changing the switches in the appropriate way. 
                                                     
3 We assume that for a particular value of SH (e.g. 1) to cause a particular value of BH (e.g. 0) it 
must be the case that BH= SH and that the latter requires that the various values of BH and SH 
be co-possible. Another way bringing out the problematic character of Halpern's analysis is that 
BH=0 is ambiguous-- it includes both (i) the case in which the bottle has been shattered (by 
Suzy) and (ii) the case in which the bottle is intact but Billy fails to hit it.  If (i), SH=0 is 
impossible, so we have a violation of co-possibility (BH=0, SH=0 are not co-possible). If (ii), SH= 
0 and so we can't have SH=1 causing BH=0.   
  
Note that all values of the variables S1, S2 and L are co-possible, in contrast to the previous 
example. Suppose L=0 before time t, S1 is turned on at t, the light consequently goes on at t and 
then S2=1 at a somewhat later time t+d. It does not seem intuitive to describe this as a pre-
emption case. Prior to t+d, S2 is not in a state that would have caused L=1 except for the action 
of S1 which is how we ordinarily think of pre-emption. After t+d, it seems most natural describe 
the case as involving overdetermination, with both S1=1 and S2 =1 causing L=1. Note that in this 
case we do not need anything analogous to the SH and BH variables in 3.4- 3.6 or anything like 
a causal connection between these variables. Moreover, although in the dual light switch case 
overdetermination is possible even if the two causes initially come on at different times, 
nothing analogous is possible in the Billy/Suzy preemption case—in that example 
overdetermination is only possible if the two causes BH=1, SH=1 become operative 
simultaneously. These differences between the two cases are closely related to the fact that in 
the light switch case “sustaining causation” must be present if the light is to remain on—at least 
one switch must remain in the on position. In the bottle case, no such sustaining causation is 
present—Suzy’s rock doesn’t have to (can’t) do anything after the bottle is broken because (as 
far as the example goes) there is no possibility of the bottle reverting to its unbroken state.  
Now contrast the version of the light case above with the following version which does 
involve irreversible causation: when either of two switches is on, the light goes on and never 
goes off regardless of the subsequent position of the switches. S1 goes on at time t and the light 
goes on at   t while S2 is still off—here it is unambiguous that S1 is the actual cause of the light 
being on. If S2 is subsequently on at time t +d, it is not an actual cause of the light being on, 
either at time t or later—there is no overdetermination when both are on, as would be the case 
when there is reversible causation. 
Again, the moral is that we need to pay attention to whether the causal relations in 
scenario are reversible or not. This affects not just how we ought to model but which kinds of 
pre-emption and overdetermination are possible. 
 
  4. Conclusion: Reversibility and Control 
 
  In addition to their importance for causal inference and modeling, reversible and 
irreversible causation also carry different possibilities for manipulation and control. Structures 
involving reversible causation have the advantage of allowing effects to be turned on and off 
via manipulation of their causes. This is a desirable feature in many biological systems and is 
present by design in many artifacts. A regulatory gene that controls protein expression can turn 
this on and off, thus creating a protein product as needed but also preventing excessive 
buildup, which is likely harmful. Structures involving reversible causation are also structures 
that can be reused as appropriate by returning the cause to its original state.  By contrast, 
irreversible causal relations are associated with cases in which repeated on/off modulation of 
the effect via the original cause is not possible and in which, in a number of such cases, no 
other means for accomplishing this are practically available. In fact, many cases of irreversible 
causation are associated with damage or destruction, as seen in many cases that figure 
prominently in philosophical discussion. When a cause acts irreversibly a system is put in a state 
that it cannot readily get out and this means that the system is not available for other sorts of 
uses, as exemplified by a broken artifact. 
 This leads us to be especially attentive to causes that are irreversible--seatbelt laws, 
helmet laws, and smoke detector regulations are designed as added protection to prevent the 
triggering of irreversible causes that lead to death and loss. On the other hand, putting a 
system in such a state can sometimes be desirable and if this is so it may be a good strategy to 
exploit an irreversible causal relation: when you poison the murderous tyrant, it is good that he 
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